Monday, February 17, 2014
You Started It - You Invaded Poland
This is going to be of interest only to those who care about history and conspiracies. That includes me.
I have just finished reading Carroll Quigley's The Anglo-American Establishment widely known in conspiracy circles as it deals with the Rhodes/Round Table group's growth into the CFR/Trilateral Commission/Bilderbergers. In fact it doesn't actually do that - effectively stopping with the outbreak of WW2 which lead the members of all groups who had promoted "appeasement" to lie low.
What the book makes abundantly clear is that not only the Round Table conspiracy but more importantly Chamberlain and his friends (which amounts to the entire party) were not only pushing "appeasement" but that the inverted commas are justified. "Appeasement" was never intended, at least by Chamberlain and co either to provide justice for german aspirations (the original reason given) or to buy Hitler off from war (the later reason). It was, at all times, a deliberate programme of building up Germany and pointing then into a genocidal war against the USSR to cruch communism (& incidentally the genocide of at least 100 million). And in which the main enemy to be bamboozled was the British people bwho would not put up with Germany being encoureged in unlimited aggression.
Start with the German reoccupation of the Rhineland which was immediately followed by an Anglo-German Naval Treaty 1935 (p 270) in which Britain recognised Germany's right to breach the Versailles Treaty by building a navy 35% of the size of Britain's in surface ships and unlimited submarines. This is normally considered simple poltroonery by Chamberlain but the book explains how it was no such thing. It was an attempt to put Britain in a direct alliance with Nazi Germany against France. The point is that France and Britain already had a naval alliance by which France had agreed to keep its navy to 33% of Britain's. We released Germany from its Versailles obligations but not France from their's. Thus we were giving Germany the power to defeat France at sea, particularly since France had to station ships in the far east to protect indo-China and the Mediterranean to deter Mussolini. At one blow Chamberlain emasculated our big nominal ally and did so sufficiently unobtrusively that nobody could effectively object.
This ties in with something Quigley's book doesn't mention - that when the Spanish Civil war broke out the British government told France, that if they helped the government, the way the Italians and Germans were helping Franco, we would consider that to be aggression under the Locarno Treaty by which Britain had guaranteed to support the non-aggressor side in a Franco-German war.
In 1937 our Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax had a long conversation with Hitler which German records show he said "(a) Britain regarded Germany as the chief bulwark against communism in Europe; (b) Britain wantecd a 4 power agreement between Britain, Germany, france & Italy to run Europe; (c) Germany couls liquidate Austria, Czecholsovakia and Poland if it could be done without provoking a war Britain would be however unwillingly dragged into" (p 275).
What Hitler apparently did not appreciate was how much the British government feared that the British people would insist on us standing by our treaty obligations (or, perhaps more likely, refuse to re-elect the Tories if they betrayed them) so that to do this Germany had to do it by threats and limited aggression while avoiding a general war.
Possibly Hitler didn't entirely understand the subtlties of such a "democratic" politician and his need to have a fig leaf to conceal what he was doing from the people.
That is pretty much what they did. Chamberlain ensured that the Munich Agreement "negotiations" involved those 4 countries but not the USSR or Czechs despite the fact they were willing to fight and italy wasn't.
During these "negotiations" Chamberalain arranged an entirely spurious "poison gas air raid" scare purely to scare the population into obedience - there was no military justification for it whatsoever.
Then, following a speech in Birmingham where the audience made it clear to Chamberlain they did not want to sell out to Hitler (mentioned in AJP Taylors Origins of the 2nd World War rather than this book) he covered himself by offering a guarantee to Poland.
But Quigly points out that this was not meant to be a serious guarantee. Specifically it was a guarantee only of the continued existence of a Polish state not of its territory. In particular Danzig and the Polish corridor were up for grabs. In fact Chamberlain tried to use his guarantee as an excuse to press Poland to give up that territory.
The objective, the book says, was to give Germany that corridor which would thus give it a continuous frontier up to the Baltic states which Germany could then seize giving it a frontier with the USSR, enabling his desired war of genocidal aggression.
This also explains the nature of British "negotiation" with Russia for a collective security guarantee of Poland - why it was designed to ensure Russia could not safely accept it. The French, not being privy to the plot always wanted a straight 3 power defencive alliance and guarantee of Poland which was exactly what Britain's government feared since it would have averted WW2 (or if Hitler and the Germans were wholly insane, ensured it was over in weeks). What we offered instead was that Russia make a unilateral offer to go to war to defend Poland, if asked, without any corresponding collective security promise from the allies, or indeed Poland. That would have given Poland more leeway in negotiating away their corridor but done absolutely nothing to prevent the war Chamberlain was pushing for (p 300). Also on 25th August the, a week before the war broke out, the British ambassador offered an alliance between us against Russia after a successful "negotiation" with Poland (p299).
And so we had WW2.
I think that if Hitler had just realised how deceitful Chamberlain's policy was he would simply have said that his attack on Poland was to seize the corridor and other territory and would maintain an "independent" Poland, albeit German occupied, our government, eager for this war against Russia, would have accepted that.
Enen during the Phoney War, where we were technically at war with Germany but doing nothing, he made 2 attempts to get into war with Russia at the same time (over Finland and incredibly by planning bombing Georgia). This attempt to make it an absolutely unwinnable war can nonly be explained if Chamberlain was as totally loony as Hitler is sometimes said to have been, or it it was an attempt to produce a fait accompli for the british people that would oblige us to switch enemies even at that late date.
I have just finished reading Carroll Quigley's The Anglo-American Establishment widely known in conspiracy circles as it deals with the Rhodes/Round Table group's growth into the CFR/Trilateral Commission/Bilderbergers. In fact it doesn't actually do that - effectively stopping with the outbreak of WW2 which lead the members of all groups who had promoted "appeasement" to lie low.
What the book makes abundantly clear is that not only the Round Table conspiracy but more importantly Chamberlain and his friends (which amounts to the entire party) were not only pushing "appeasement" but that the inverted commas are justified. "Appeasement" was never intended, at least by Chamberlain and co either to provide justice for german aspirations (the original reason given) or to buy Hitler off from war (the later reason). It was, at all times, a deliberate programme of building up Germany and pointing then into a genocidal war against the USSR to cruch communism (& incidentally the genocide of at least 100 million). And in which the main enemy to be bamboozled was the British people bwho would not put up with Germany being encoureged in unlimited aggression.
Start with the German reoccupation of the Rhineland which was immediately followed by an Anglo-German Naval Treaty 1935 (p 270) in which Britain recognised Germany's right to breach the Versailles Treaty by building a navy 35% of the size of Britain's in surface ships and unlimited submarines. This is normally considered simple poltroonery by Chamberlain but the book explains how it was no such thing. It was an attempt to put Britain in a direct alliance with Nazi Germany against France. The point is that France and Britain already had a naval alliance by which France had agreed to keep its navy to 33% of Britain's. We released Germany from its Versailles obligations but not France from their's. Thus we were giving Germany the power to defeat France at sea, particularly since France had to station ships in the far east to protect indo-China and the Mediterranean to deter Mussolini. At one blow Chamberlain emasculated our big nominal ally and did so sufficiently unobtrusively that nobody could effectively object.
This ties in with something Quigley's book doesn't mention - that when the Spanish Civil war broke out the British government told France, that if they helped the government, the way the Italians and Germans were helping Franco, we would consider that to be aggression under the Locarno Treaty by which Britain had guaranteed to support the non-aggressor side in a Franco-German war.
In 1937 our Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax had a long conversation with Hitler which German records show he said "(a) Britain regarded Germany as the chief bulwark against communism in Europe; (b) Britain wantecd a 4 power agreement between Britain, Germany, france & Italy to run Europe; (c) Germany couls liquidate Austria, Czecholsovakia and Poland if it could be done without provoking a war Britain would be however unwillingly dragged into" (p 275).
What Hitler apparently did not appreciate was how much the British government feared that the British people would insist on us standing by our treaty obligations (or, perhaps more likely, refuse to re-elect the Tories if they betrayed them) so that to do this Germany had to do it by threats and limited aggression while avoiding a general war.
Possibly Hitler didn't entirely understand the subtlties of such a "democratic" politician and his need to have a fig leaf to conceal what he was doing from the people.
That is pretty much what they did. Chamberlain ensured that the Munich Agreement "negotiations" involved those 4 countries but not the USSR or Czechs despite the fact they were willing to fight and italy wasn't.
During these "negotiations" Chamberalain arranged an entirely spurious "poison gas air raid" scare purely to scare the population into obedience - there was no military justification for it whatsoever.
Then, following a speech in Birmingham where the audience made it clear to Chamberlain they did not want to sell out to Hitler (mentioned in AJP Taylors Origins of the 2nd World War rather than this book) he covered himself by offering a guarantee to Poland.
But Quigly points out that this was not meant to be a serious guarantee. Specifically it was a guarantee only of the continued existence of a Polish state not of its territory. In particular Danzig and the Polish corridor were up for grabs. In fact Chamberlain tried to use his guarantee as an excuse to press Poland to give up that territory.
The objective, the book says, was to give Germany that corridor which would thus give it a continuous frontier up to the Baltic states which Germany could then seize giving it a frontier with the USSR, enabling his desired war of genocidal aggression.
This also explains the nature of British "negotiation" with Russia for a collective security guarantee of Poland - why it was designed to ensure Russia could not safely accept it. The French, not being privy to the plot always wanted a straight 3 power defencive alliance and guarantee of Poland which was exactly what Britain's government feared since it would have averted WW2 (or if Hitler and the Germans were wholly insane, ensured it was over in weeks). What we offered instead was that Russia make a unilateral offer to go to war to defend Poland, if asked, without any corresponding collective security promise from the allies, or indeed Poland. That would have given Poland more leeway in negotiating away their corridor but done absolutely nothing to prevent the war Chamberlain was pushing for (p 300). Also on 25th August the, a week before the war broke out, the British ambassador offered an alliance between us against Russia after a successful "negotiation" with Poland (p299).
And so we had WW2.
I think that if Hitler had just realised how deceitful Chamberlain's policy was he would simply have said that his attack on Poland was to seize the corridor and other territory and would maintain an "independent" Poland, albeit German occupied, our government, eager for this war against Russia, would have accepted that.
Enen during the Phoney War, where we were technically at war with Germany but doing nothing, he made 2 attempts to get into war with Russia at the same time (over Finland and incredibly by planning bombing Georgia). This attempt to make it an absolutely unwinnable war can nonly be explained if Chamberlain was as totally loony as Hitler is sometimes said to have been, or it it was an attempt to produce a fait accompli for the british people that would oblige us to switch enemies even at that late date.
Labels: British politics, conspiracies, History
